Meyer, Kent and Clifton (MKC) claim to have nullified the Bell-KochenSpecker (Bell-KS) theorem. It is true that they invalidate KS's account of the theorem's physical implications. However, they do not invalidate Bell's point, that quantum mechanics is inconsistent with the classical assumption, that a measurement tells us about a property previously possessed by the system. This failure of classical ideas about measurement is, perhaps, the single most important implication of quantum mechanics. In a conventional colouring there are some remaining patches of white. MKC fill in these patches, but only at the price of introducing patches where the colouring becomes "pathologically" discontinuous. The discontinuities mean that the colours in these patches are empirically unknowable. We prove a general theorem which shows that their extent is at least as great as the patches of white in a conventional approach. The theorem applies, not only to the MKC colourings, but also to any other such attempt to circumvent the Bell-KS theorem (Pitowsky's colourings, for example). We go on to discuss the implications. MKC do not nullify the Bell-KS theorem. They do, however, show that we did not, hitherto, properly understand the theorem. For that reason their results (and Pitowsky's earlier results) are of major importance. 
Introduction
In ordinary language the word "measurement" very strongly suggests the ascertaining of some pre-existing property of some thing, any instrument involved playing a purely passive role (in the words of Bell [1] , p.166). The Bell-Kochen-Specker (Bell-KS) theorem [2, 3] shows that quantum mechanics is inconsistent with that natural idea.
Or so Bell thought. His conclusion has, however, been challenged: first by Pitowsky [4, 5] , and then, using a different set-theoretic argument, by Meyer [6] , Kent [7] and Clifton and Kent [8] (MKC). MKC's argument was inspired by the previous work of Hales and Strauss [9] and Godsil and Zaks [10] . It has attracted much comment [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] .
MKC claim to have "nullified" the Bell-KS theorem. They mean by this that the theorem, though mathematically valid, is not physically significant. Pitowsky expresses himself less forcefully. He does not say, in so many words, that the Bell-KS theorem is entirely without significance. However, he clearly means to insinuate doubts.
Now there can be no question as to the importance of the results proved by Pitowsky and MKC (PMKC). They clearly have some major consequences. However, we will argue that these consequences are less catastrophic than MKC think. They do not show that the Bell-KS theorem is without significance. They only show that we need to reassess its significance.
The question is complicated by the fact that the Bell-KS theorem was proved twice over: first by Bell [2] , and then again by Kochen and Specker [3] . They expressed strikingly different views as to the theorem's physical significance. So the first thing one needs to ask is: what, exactly, is it that the MKC models are supposed to nullify?
In Section 8 we will argue that PMKC have indeed invalidated Kochen and Specker's account of the theorem's significance. We will also argue that Bell's account contains a number of serious misconceptions. So it is true that PMKC nullify some of what was previously seen as the theorem's significance. But they do not nullify it all. In particular, they do not nullify Bell's main point, as stated above. It remains the case that quantum mechanics is inconsistent with classical ideas about measurement.
The fact that PMKC cannot have fully restored the ordinary, or classical concept of measurement becomes obvious, as soon as one reflects that their models are still hidden variables theories.
A hidden variables theory is one in which the pre-existing values are, for some reason, concealed. But if the observables could be measured in the ordinary, classical sense, then the values would not be concealed. They would be open-to-view, as in classical physics. It follows that, in a hidden variables theory, there must necessarily be some breakdown of classical assumptions about measurement.
In Bohmian mechanics the values are concealed because measurements are typically contextual. Instead of the instrument playing a purely passive role, as it would classically, there is a complex interplay between system and instrument. The effect is to create a value, which did not exist before. As Bell puts it:
The result of a 'spin measurement', for example, depends in a very complicated way on the initial position λ of the particle and on the strength and geometry of the magnetic field. Thus the result of the measurement does not actually tell us about some property previously possessed by the system, but about something which has come into being in the combination of system and apparatus. [Bell [1] , p. 35] (for a more detailed discussion of this point see Dewdney et al [19] and Holland [20] ).
PMKC have discovered a completely different mechanism for concealing the values. This is an important discovery. It means, in particular, that Bell's emphasis on the active role of the apparatus needs revision. Nevertheless, their models still are hidden variables theories. So Bell's main point, that a measurement outcome "does not actually tell us about some property previously possessed by the system," still stands.
The variables are hidden in the PMKC models because their colourings are violently, and even "pathologically" discontinuous (the relevance of continuity in this regard is noted by Mermin [17] ).
Consider, for instance, the colouring described by Meyer [6] . This function is discontinuous at every point in its domain of definition. It is, in other words, as discontinuous as a function can possibly get.
In a conventional colouring, such as a political map of the Earth, the paints are applied in broad strokes to well-behaved regions having regular boundaries. This means that it is almost always possible, using finite precision measurements, to find out what country one is in. It is true that infinite precision would be needed if one was situated exactly on a boundary. However, there is zero probability of hitting such a point.
Meyer's colouring is not like that. In the Meyer colouring it is as if, before applying the paints, one first mixes them, to the maximum extent possible, so that the colours become intermingled at the molecular level. It is (so to speak) a maximum entropy colouring. This makes the colours unobservable.
At least, the colours are not observable using finite precision measurements. MKC say that finite precision nullifies the KS theorem. But it would be nearer the truth if one said that finite precision saves the KS theorem.
Suppose one tries to find out the value of some particular vector n ∈ S 2 Q (where S 2 Q is the rational unit 2-sphere, on which the Meyer colouring is defined) using a finite precision measurement. The finite precision means that the measurement actually reveals the value of some unknown vector n ′ , with |n ′ − n| ≤ ǫ for some positive ǫ. If the colouring were continuous at n, and if ǫ were sufficiently small, then the value of n ′ would be the same as the value of n. However, the colouring is, in fact, discontinuous. This means that, no matter how small the error ǫ, the measurement provides no more information about the value of n than could be obtained by simply guessing a number at random (assuming that ǫ is not actually 0). The value is therefore unobservable, or hidden.
A procedure which leaves the experimenter in complete ignorance of the preexisting values is clearly not a measurement in the classical sense. MKC focus on the point that, in their models, a measurement does always reveal the preexisting value of something: namely, the value of the vector n ′ representing the true alignment of the instrument. What they overlook is that the experimenter does not know the true alignment of the instrument. This means that, although the experimenter learns a value, s/he has no idea what it is a value of. Consequently, the experimenter does not acquire any actual knowledge.
A classical measurement is not simply a procedure which reveals a pre-existing value. Rather, it is a procedure which ascertains a pre-existing fact, of the form "observable A had value x". The specification of the observable A is no less essential than the specification of the value x. The problem with the PMKC models is that the observable A is not specified, so the experimenter only learns " . . . had value x". This statement is completely uninformative. It says no more than the statement "observable A had . . . ". Indeed, it says no more than the completely empty statement " . . . had . . . ".
What emerges from this is that PMKC have been asking the wrong question. The important question is not: "How much of S 2 (the full unit 2-sphere) can be coloured at all ?" But rather: "How much of S 2 can be coloured in such a way that the colours are empirically knowable?"
In Sections 2-7 we address that question. We have seen that, in the case of Meyer's model, none of the colours are empirically knowable. We need to consider whether another model might improve on that.
So as to have a standard of comparison we begin, in Section 2, by defining the concept of a regular KS-colouring. Intuitively, this is a colouring where the paint is applied in broad strokes, as in a political map of the Earth. We show that a regular KS-colouring must exclude a region having non-empty interior and subtending solid angle ≥ 4πd R . Here d R is a fixed positive number whose value is determined, once and for all, by the principles of quantum mechanics.
We refer to functions of the same general kind as the PMKC colourings as pseudo-KS-colourings of S 2 . In Section 3 we identify two conditions satisfied by every PMKC colouring (both the ones constructed by Pitowsky and the ones constructed by MKC). We argue that they would also have to be satisfied by any other pseudo-KS-colouring.
In Sections 4-5 we use these conditions to analyze the discontinuities of an arbitrary pseudo-KS-colouring. We show that S 2 splits into an open set U , which is regularly KS-colourable, and a closed set D on which the discontinuities make the colours empirically unknowable. In the case of Meyer's colouring U is empty and D = S 2 . In the general case D might be smaller. However, it cannot be shrunk to nothing. The fact that U is regularly KS-colourable means that D must always have non-empty interior, and subtend solid angle ≥ 4πd R .
In Section 6 we infer that the Bell-KS theorem is not nullified. A conventional colouring must exclude a region D which is simply not coloured at all. PMKC have found ways to extend the colouring into D. However, they only do so at the price of making the valuation so extremely discontinuous that the colours are empirically unknowable. From the point of view of a finite precision experimenter, who wants to ascertain the pre-existing values, this is not an improvement.
The fact that the colours cannot all be empirically knowable is also shown by Cabello [15] . However, the relation between Cabello's argument and ours may not be immediately apparent. In Section 7 we elucidate the relationship.
Finally, in Section 8 we assess the implications of PMKC's discoveries, and our counter-argument. PMKC clearly nullify some of what used to be seen as the Bell-KS theorem's significance. We will argue that they completely invalidate what KS say on the subject. They also invalidate some of the things said by Bell. In addition we present some further criticisms of Bell, which are only indirectly inspired by PMKC's argument. In short, PMKC make us recognize that we did not, in the past, fully understand what the theorem is telling us.
However, none of this detracts from the theorem's importance. The failure of classical assumptions about measurement is arguably the single most revolutionary feature of quantum mechanics.
Regular KS-Colourings
We begin by showing that there is certainly no question of nullifying the Bell-KS theorem by means of the kind of well-behaved colouring one sees in a political map of the Earth. The results proved in this section will also play an important role in our subsequent analysis of the PMKC models.
The Bell-KS theorem states that there is no valuation f : S 2 → {0, 1} (where S 2 is the unit 2-sphere) such that f (−n) = f (n) for all n and
for every triad (every triplet of orthogonal unit vectors) n 1 , n 2 , n 3 . The problem exposed by PMKC is that this statement, as it stands, is very weak. It asserts that one cannot KS-colour absolutely all of S 2 . But it does not place any stronger constraint on the maximum size of a KS-colourable set. It consequently leaves PMKC free to argue that one can KS-colour effectively all of S 2 , in some suitably defined sense of the word "effectively".
In this section we make a first step in the direction of strengthening the theorem, by establishing constraints on the sizes of some special kinds of KS-colourable set.
We will have occasion to consider (1) the class B consisting of all KS-colourable Borel sets (i.e. all KS-colourable sets which are measurable with respect to the usual rotationally invariant measure on S 2 ). (2) the class C consisting of all closed KS-colourable sets. (3) the class O consisting of all open KS-colourable sets. However, we are mainly interested in the class R ⊆ O consisting of all regularly KS-colourable sets. Intuitively, a regular KS-colouring is one which exhibits the same kind of "good" behaviour one sees in a political map of the Earth. Formally, a KS-colouring f : U → {0, 1} is regular if U is open and f is almost everywhere continuous on U .
Before proceeding further we ought to remove a potential ambiguity. We consider a function f : K → {0, 1} defined on a subset K ⊂ S 2 to be a KS-colouring if and only if
(1) f (−n) = f (n) whenever −n and n both ∈ K.
for every orthogonal pair n 1 , n 2 ∈ K We do not require that linear combinations of pairs of orthogonal vectors both fevaluating to 1 should also f -evaluate to 1 (except, of course, when that is implied by condition 2). The reason for not imposing this additional requirement will appear in Section 3.
We begin by proving
Remark. In other words K must exclude at least one non-empty disk of the form {n ∈ S 2 : cos −1 (n · n 0 ) < r} with centre n 0 and radius r > 0.
Proof. If K ∈ C the statement is immediate, since S 2 − K is then open (being the complement of a closed set) and non-empty (in view of the Bell-KS theorem).
If, on the other hand, K ∈ O or R we have to work a little harder. Let {n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n L } be any finite KS-uncolourable set. The fact that K is KScolourable means that at least one of these vectors must belong to S 2 − K. We may assume the labelling is such that, for some l ≥ 1,
If l < L, then the fact that K is open means that we can choose δ > 0 such that {m ∈ S 2 : cos
If n i is in the interior of S 2 − K for some 1 ≤ i ≤ l, then the interior of S 2 − K is non-empty, and the claim is proven.
Otherwise the vectors n 1 , . . . , n l are all on the boundary of S 2 − K. We can then choose a rotation, through an angle < δ, which moves some of the vectors n 1 , . . . , n l out of S 2 − K, without moving any of the vectors n l+1 , . . . , n L out of K. After suitable re-labelling this gives us a new KS-uncolourable set {n
If it should still happen that none of the vectors {n
2 − K we may repeat the procedure. It is impossible to move all the vectors out of S 2 − K so after sufficiently many iterations at least one of the vectors must be in the interior of S 2 − K. Consequently, the interior of S 2 − K cannot be empty.
Our second result concerns the maximum area of a KS-colourable set. Define
where µ is the usual rotationally invariant measure on S 2 , normalized so that µ(S 2 ) = 1 (in other words, the solid angle scaled by 1/4π). We will refer to these numbers as deficits. They tell us the size of the region excluded by a colouring of maximal extent.
In Appendix A we prove
. It can also be shown (see, for example, Halmos [21] , Chapter 10) that each Borel set B contains a sequence of closed subsets C n such that µ(B) = lim n→∞ (µ(C n )).
Putting these facts together we deduce
It would be interesting to know whether the two inequalities at the left-hand end of the chain are actually strict. That is a question which requires further investigation.
It would also be interesting to know the values of the deficits. It is easy 1 to construct a regular KS-colouring which covers 87% of S 2 . So we know that d R (and therefore d O and d B ) must be ≤ 0.13. In Appendix A we show that d B is bounded from below by an integral defined in terms of a finite KS-uncolourable set. For the sets which have been described in the literature this integral is rather small. For instance, in the case of the Conway-Kochen set [22, 23] the integral is 0.01 (see Appendix A). So the possibility is not excluded that ∼ 99% of the total solid angle can be covered with a KS-colourable Borel set (in terms of the Earth this would correspond to colouring everything except a region about the size of Australia).
One should, however, note that the integral is sensitive to the angular separation of the rays in the corresponding KS-uncolourable set. It follows that, if one could find a set containing many fewer rays than the Conway-Kochen set, this would be likely to give a subsantially larger lower bound. In any case, the integral is only a 1 Simply assign 0 to the two polar caps defined by | tan θ| < 1 and 1 to the equatorial region defined by | tan θ| > √ 2 (where θ is the usual polar angle). It is easily verified that this gives a regular KS-colouring covering a region having µ-
bound on d B , not the actual value. Lastly, it is possible that the deficits are larger in higher dimensions. The results we prove are enough to establish that the Bell-KS theorem is not nullified. However, it remains an open question, quite how close the theorem gets to being nullified. This too is a point that requires further investigation.
Pseudo-KS-Colourings
We refer to functions like the ones constructed by PMKC as pseudo-KS-colourings of S 2 . In this section we identify two conditions which the PMKC colourings all satisfy (both the ones constructed by Pitowsky and the ones constructed by MKC). We argue that they would also have to be satisfied by any other pseudo-KS-colouring.
We aim to give a completely general analysis, applying to any pseudo-KScolouring. But let us begin by looking at the particular colourings constructed by PMKC.
The clearest and most succinct description of the Pitowsky colourings is in Pitowsky [4] . Pitowsky [5] contains important additional material concerning the measure-theoretic aspects. The interested reader should also consult Pitowsky [24, 25] (which concern the Bell inequalities) and comments by Mermin and Macdonald [26] .
Pitowsky's approach is to define a function f : S 2 → {0, 1} on the whole of S 2 . This means he has to relax the requirement, that f should sum to 2 on every triad. Instead, he imposes the weaker requirement, that f should sum to 2 on almost every triad (in a sense of the word "almost" which is not the standard measure-theoretic sense-see below).
Specifically, Pitowsky shows that there exist functions f : S 2 → {0, 1} such that
For all n, there are at most countably many orthogonal pairs m, l ∈ n ⊥ for which f (n) + f (m) + f (l) = 2 (7) (where n ⊥ is the orthogonal complement of n). Let T be the space of all triads, and let N ⊂ T be the set of "wrongly" coloured triads. A Pitowsky colouring has the property that p(N |n) = 0 for all n ∈ S 2 (where p(N |n) is the conditional probability of selecting a "wrongly" coloured triad, given that n is one of its elements). Pitowsky infers that p(N ) = 0, so that almost all triads are "correctly" coloured.
It should be stressed that there is a problem with this argument. Although p(N |n) is well-defined (in terms of the usual invariant measure on the circle), there is a serious difficulty with the definition of p(N ). This is because N is not a Borel set (as follows from a variant of Lemma 2 in the last section, applying to T instead of S 2 ). Pitowsky consequently has to rely on "a strange concept of probability which violates the axiom of additivity" [25] . For that reason his results have attracted less attention than the subsequent work of MKC 2 . MKC's achievement was to find a way of obviating this difficulty. Their argument is formulated exclusively in terms of the standard theory of probability, as 2 Nevertheless, they are still worth considering: not only for reasons of completeness, but also because of their own intrinsic interest. In particular, Pitowsky's attempt to extract deep physical meaning from the arcana of axiomatic set theory is, to our mind, intriguing.
Pitowsky's non-standard concept of probability is certainly a source of serious difficulty. On the other hand, there is some force to his contention that, since p(N |n) is well defined, it ought to be possible to make sense of p(N ) also. Perhaps it is true that one cannot make sense of p(N ) while remaining within the framework of the Kolmogorov axioms. But that could be countered by asking whether there is any cogent physical reason which compels us to accept the Kolmogorov axioms (see Pitowsky [24, 25] ).
formalized by the Kolmogorov axioms. It therefore compels us to take Pitowsky's suggestion, that the Bell-KS theorem may not have the implications usually imputed to it, much more seriously.
Pitowsky assigns values to the whole of S 2 . Meyer's [6] key insight is that we do not need to colour the whole of S 2 in order to account for the observations. We might, for instance, be living in a world where the only physically possible alignments are those specified by vectors n ∈ S 2 Q (i.e. unit vectors n whose components are all rational).
An experimenter may, indeed, set out with the intention of measuring in a direction n / ∈ S 2 Q . However, the finite precision of real laboratory measurements means that we can never exclude the possibility that s/he actually measures along a slightly different direction n ′ which does ∈ S 2 Q . The set S 2 Q is KS-colourable. Furthermore, the set of rational triads is dense in the space of all real triads. Meyer concludes that, since in this model a measurement does always reveal the preexisting value of the vector which is actually measured, the Bell-KS theorem is nullified.
Kent [7] subsequently extended Meyer's results to higher dimensional spaces. Clifton and Kent [8] then showed that, in the case of finite dimensional systems, models of the same general type can reproduce all the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics, in so far as these are verifiable by finite precision measurements (though it should be noted that the Clifton-Kent models are still incomplete in that they do not specify the dynamical behaviour of the system).
We want to give an argument which applies quite generally, not only to the particular constructions of Pitowsky and MKC, but also to any other model which might conceivably be thought to nullify the Bell-KS theorem. We therefore need to identify some minimal conditions which a function f : K → {0, 1} must satisfy, if it is to count as a pseudo-KS-colouring of S 2 . Our first such condition is the following:
We consider this condition to be necessary because, if it is not satisfied, there is a non-empty disk which is not coloured at all. It should be noted that we do not require that K is countable (as in the MKC colourings). In particular, the possibility is not excluded that K = S 2 (as in the Pitowsky colourings). We do not require f to be a KS-colouring of K. Nor do we require it to be Borel-measurable. We do, however, require Condition 2. Suppose that n 1 , n 2 , n 3 is a triad of vectors ∈ S 2 (they need not ∈ K), and suppose that, for each r, U r is an open neighbourhood of n r with the property K ∩ U r ⊆ f −1 ({a r }) for a r = 0 or 1. Then
Similarly, if n 1 , n 2 is an orthogonal pair of vectors ∈ S 2 (not necessarily ∈ K), and if, for each r, n r has an open neighbourhood U r such that K ∩ U r ⊆ f −1 ({a r }) for a r = 0 or 1, then
The reader may verify that the colourings described by PMKC satisfy this condition. We consider it to be necessary because, if it is not satisfied, there exist finite precision measurements whose outcomes are guaranteed to conflict with the predictions of quantum mechanics
3 This is the reason we adopted the less restrictive definition of a KS-colourable set in Section 2.
It is not obvious that the same would be true of the version of condition 2 corresponding to the more restrictive definition.
Let us stress that these are minimal conditions, which every pseudo-KS-colouring must satisfy. They are not intended to fully characterize the concept.
The Phenomenological Colouring
The mathematical properties of a pseudo-KS-colouring are best visualized using a three-coloured variant of the usual chromatic metaphor. We will call this the phenomenological colouring. Intuitively, it describes what is seen when the sphere is viewed through finite resolution eyes.
Consider some fixed pseudo-KS-colouring f : K → {0, 1}. Let K 0 = f −1 ({0}) be the set of points f -evaluating to 0, and let K 1 = f −1 ({1}) be the set of points f -evaluating to 1.
We begin by defining a true, or intrinsic colouring. We take points ∈ K 0 to be intrinsically blue, and points ∈ K 1 to be intrinsically red. Points / ∈ K (if any) we take to be intrinsically white.
Suppose, now, that one has an open region which entirely consists of points intrinsically blue or white. We take it that such a region, seen through finite resolution eyes, would appear phenomenologically blue (all of it, including the points which are intrinsically white). Similarly, we take it that an open region which entirely consists of points intrinsically red or white would appear phenomenologically red (all of it, including the points which are intrinsically white).
Suppose, on the other hand, that each neighbourhood of n contains at least one intrinsically blue point, and at least one intrinsically red point. Then we take n to be phenomenologically black (irrespective of whether it is in fact intrinsically blue, red or white).
One can think of the phenomenological colours as arising through the mixing of the true or intrinsic paints 4 . However, this mixing analogy, though helpful on an intuitive level, should not be taken too far. For instance, a single intrinsically blue point surrounded by a region which is otherwise intrinsically pure red counts, on our definition, as phenomenologically black (not red as, one might argue, it would actually appear).
Our aim in this is not really to describe the actual visual appearance of a surface which has been stippled with differently coloured microscopic dots. We simply want to present a convenient way to picture the abstract mathematical properties of a pseudo-KS-colouring.
The Discontinuity Region
We now use the phenomenological colouring to investigate the discontinuities of f .
Let us begin by defining the phenomenological colouring in more formal terms.
The phenomenological colouringf : S 2 → {0, 1, −1} may now be defined formally, byf
In practice a mixture of blue and red paint gives purple, not black. We, however, are considering paint that is ideally blue (so that it is a perfect absorber for wavelengths ≥ 491 nm) and paint that is ideally red (so that it is a perfect absorber for wavelengths ≤ 647 nm).
Thus, n is phenomenologically blue, red or black depending on whether itfevaluates to 0, 1, or −1 respectively. This topological gambit enables us to escape all the difficulties arising from the fact that f is not assumed to be Borel-measurable. K 0 , K 1 may or may not be Borel sets. However, U 0 , U 1 (being open) and D (being closed) are guaranteed to be Borel sets. Consequently,f is guaranteed to be Borel-measurable.
Let U = U 0 ∪ U 1 . Then the true colouring f is continuous at every point of K ∩ U , and discontinuous at every point of K ∩ D. We will therefore refer to U as the continuity region, and to D as the discontinuity region.
The significance of these sets is that they describe the extent to which the true colours are empirically knowable.
Suppose k ∈ K ∩ U . Then every vector ∈ K sufficiently close to k has the same intrinsic colour as k. Consequently, a sufficiently accurate finite precision measurement in the approximate direction of k is guaranteed to reveal that colour.
Suppose, on the other hand, that k ∈ K ∩ D. Then each neighbourhood of k, no matter how small, contains infinitely many other vectors ∈ K having the opposite intrinsic colour. This means that the true colour of k cannot be reliably ascertained by finite precision measurement in the direction k.
It is obvious that D cannot be empty (S 2 is connected so it cannot be the disjoint union of two non-empty open sets U 0 and U 1 ). That would not be a serious problem if D was in some sense negligible (even a political map of the Earth is discontinuous on the boundary lines). However, D is, in fact, non-negligible, as the following theorem shows. Theorem 1. Let f : K → {0, 1} be a pseudo-KS-colouring of S 2 , with continuity region U , and discontinuity region D. Letf 0 : U → {0, 1} be the restriction of the phenomenological colouring to U . Then
Remark. d R is the deficit defined in Eq. (5).
Proof. We only need prove the first of these statements. The other two statements will then be immediate consequences of results proved in Section 2 . We note, first of all, thatf 0 is continuous (because the setsf Now let n 1 , n 2 , n 3 be any triad of vectors ∈ U . Sincef 0 is continuous we can choose, for each r, an open neighbourhood V r of n r such that V r ⊆ U andf 0 (m) = f 0 (n r ) for all m ∈ V r . Consequently f (m) =f 0 (n r ) for all m ∈ K ∩ V r . It now follows from condition 2 in Section 3 that
In the same way we can showf
for any pair of orthogonal vectors n 1 , n 2 ∈ U . This shows thatf 0 is a KS-colouring. The regularity is a consequence of the fact thatf 0 is continuous. Theorem 1 is the central result of this paper. It shows that, in so far as the aim is to maximize the area on which the true colours are empirically knowable, pseudo-KS-colourings do no better than regular ones.
In the remainder of this section we examine the internal structure of D. It should already be apparent that the discontinuities might fairly be described as "pathological". However, in the general case the situation is more complicated than it is with Meyer's colouring.
Let D i be the interior of D. In D i the valuation shows exactly the same kind of "pathologically" discontinuous behaviour as the Meyer colouring. Each n ∈ D i is surrounded by a disk which is pure phenomenological black. This means that the intrinsic blues and reds are completely intermixed, everywhere, at the molecular level so to speak. In the case of the Meyer colouring D i = S 2 . In the general case it may be smaller. But it must always happen that µ(D i ) > 0.
If the boundary of D is sufficiently well-behaved-if, for example, it consists of a finite set of closed C 1 curves-then µ(D i ) = µ(D). However, in the general case it might happen that µ(D i ) < µ(D) (it might, for example, happen that D has an infinitely complex lace-like structure, something like what one sees in the Mandelbrot set [27] ). We therefore need to examine the nature of the discontinuities outside D i . For that we can appeal to the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let f : K → {0, 1} be a pseudo-KS-colouring with discontinuity region D. Let S(n, ǫ) = {m ∈ S 2 : cos −1 (m · n) < ǫ} be the disk with centre n and angular radius ǫ. Then the limit
exists and = 1 for almost all n ∈ D.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Let D m be the subset of D on which the limit exists and = 1. It is easily seen that D i ⊆ D m . We can think of D m as the measure-theoretic interior. In some ways it gives a better idea of the interior, intuitively conceived, than the set D i , defined topologically.
If n ∈ D m − D i the disk S(n, ǫ) is not completely pure black for any positive ǫ (otherwise n would ∈ D i ). However, if ǫ is sufficiently small the disk is nearly pure black. Furthermore, the proportion of blackness comes arbitrarily close to 1 as ǫ → 0. This means that the mixing of intrinsic blues and reds in the vicinity of n is not entirely complete. There are some microscopic specks of phenomenological blue or red. However, the mixing is nearly complete-implying that the intrinsic valuation f exhibits nearly the same degree of "pathological" discontinuity here that it does on D i .
The intrinsic colours of vectors ∈ K ∩ (D m − D i ) cannot be ascertained by finite precision measurement. Let us note that the same is effectively true of the vectors in the specks of phenomenological blue or red buried deep in the interstices of the region D m − D i . Strictly speaking these specks are contained in U , not D. However, as one pushes in closer and closer to a vector n ∈ D m − D i the specks become smaller and smaller. Consequently, the precision needed to ascertain the true colours of the vectors in them grows without bound. There will, for instance, come a point when the precision needed is so large that it would take a disk-pack the size of the observable universe to store the bit-string specifying a single vector k to that degree of exactitude. We may say that the true colours of such vectors are unobservable FAPP (unobservable "for all practical purposes").
We may thus visualize D as consisting of three concentric layers:
(1) An inner core D i on which f has the same "pathologically" discontinuous character as Meyer's colouring. Let us make one final point. Even the mildest of discontinuities is enough to frustrate the finite precision experimenter. Consider two colourings (not KS-colourings) g b and g r each of which assigns blue to everything north of the equator, and red to everything south of it. However, the equator itself is coloured blue by g b and red by g r . Then g b and g r are empirically indistinguishable.
It is tempting to think of a line discontinuity as somehow "harmless". This is true in the sense that the line has µ-measure zero (implying that there is zero probability of landing on it). But it is still the case that the line's true colour is unobservable.
The Bell-KS Theorem is not Nullified
In a regular KS-colouring there are some remaining patches of white, which are simply not coloured at all. A pseudo-KS-colouring replaces these patches of white with patches of black, on which the colours are defined, but empirically unknowable. From the point of view of a finite precision experimenter, who wants to ascertain the intrinsic colour of a specified point, this is not an improvement.
Conventional models, such as the Bohm theory, and unconventional models, such as the ones proposed by PMKC, make completely different statements about what is going on "behind the scenes". In a conventional model the pre-existing values are concealed because the apparatus actively manufactures new values. In a PMKC model, by contrast, the values are concealed because the valuation is "pathologically" discontinuous.
The difference is important. The PMKC models have major implications for the way we understand the Bell-KS theorem, as we discuss in Section 8. However, these implications do not include the statement, that the theorem is nullified. Bell's point, that a quantum measurement "does not actually tell us about some property previously possessed by the system" (Bell [1] , p.35) remains intact.
Cabello's Argument
Cabello [15] , in an important paper, has given an argument which is closely related to ours.
Suppose an experimenter makes a finite precision measurement in the direction k ∈ K with alignment uncertainty ǫ. Let p(k, ǫ) be the probability that the measurement reveals the true colour of k. Classically, one would assume
Cabello, however, shows 5 that the MKC models are inconsistent with that natural assumption. 5 We should note that Cabello states the conclusion differently. As he sees it his argument shows that the MKC models "lead to experimentally testable predictions that are in contradiction with those of quantum mechanics". However, if one examines the last paragraph in Section IV of his paper, and endnote 28 of his paper, it becomes clear that such a contradiction only arises if MKC's own assumptions are supplemented with the additional assumption that "successive tests with increasing precision will give us the true colours with a higher probability".
We are unable to detect any mathematical error in Clifon and Kent's proof [8] that their models do reproduce the experimentally testable predictions of quantum mechanics. So we conclude that what Cabello actually does is to show, by reductio ad absurdum, that the MKC models are inconsistent with his additional assumption (and consequently with our Eq. (11)).
Cabello's argument thus establishes, by a different route, the point we made in Section 5: namely, that the colours in K cannot all be reliably ascertainable by finite precision measurement.
It would be interesting to see if Cabello's approach could be extended. It would, for instance, be interesting to investigate the size of the set 6 on which lim ǫ→0 p(k, ǫ) either fails to exist, or exists but is ≪ 1.
The Physical Significance of the Bell-KS Theorem
The PMKC models show that the significance of the Bell-KS theorem is primarily epistemological: it concerns the nature and extent of the knowledge acquired by measurement. In this section we examine how far that proposition departs from the views of Bell and KS. We also explain why, in our view, the theorem matters: why it deserves its status as one of the key foundational results of quantum mechanics.
For a long time it was widely (though not universally) believed that quantum mechanics is just plain inconsistent with the classical picture, of particles moving along sharply-defined, objective trajectories. However, Bohm's 1952 rediscovery [28] of de Broglie's pilot wave theory [29] showed that that is incorrect. As Bell puts it: "in 1952 I saw the impossible done" (Bell [1] , p.160).
The Bell-KS theorem was conceived in response to that event. Bell and KS, in their different ways, were both trying to establish that a hidden variables theory does not really mark the restoration of classical physics. However, their attitudes could hardly have been more divergent.
Let us begin by examining KS's "take" on the theorem. KS [3] describe the theorem as "a proof of the non-existence of hidden variables". This is unfortunate, for it is rather obviously no such thing. However, one finds on closer inspection that they do not really mean that. The intuition which drives their work is the perception that there is a kind of logico-mathematical symmetry to quantum mechanics, which a hidden variables theory must violate. They try to capture that intuition by means of a formal criterion. Specifically, they maintain that a "successful" hidden variables theory must assign, to each quantum observableÂ, a real function fÂ defined on a phase space Ω with the property
for each Borel function g. They use the Bell-KS theorem to infer that no such assignment is possible and, consequently, that "successful" hidden variables theories do not exist. We will not say much more about this because it is an implication that PMKC clearly do invalidate. It is true that functions satisfying Eq. (12) cannot be assigned to every quantum observable. However, Clifton and Kent [8] demonstrate, by explicit construction, that such functions can be assigned to all the observables in a dense subset. KS concede in advance that this is enough to invalidate their argument because they accept (Kochen and Specker [3] , p.70) that in fact it is not physically meaningful to assume that there are a continuum number of quantum mechanical propositions 6 Let us note that our argument in Sections 5-6, though it suggests, does not logically imply any statement regarding the size of this set. Nor does it tacitly depend on such a statement.
Suppose that, for some ǫ and some non-empty open V ⊆ D, p(k, ǫ) = 1 for all k ∈ K ∩ V . This would mean, in effect, that measurements to finite precision ǫ are really infinite precision measurements so far as the true colours are concerned. But an experimenter could not exploit this fact to acquire information about the true colours because s/he could not distinguish an instrument guaranteed to reveal the true colour of k from another instrument guaranteed to reveal the true colour of a nearby vector k ′ .
Before moving on let us say that, although KS's specific proposal has been shown not to work, there might be some substance to their underlying intuition. It certainly seems to this writer (on an intuitive level) that there is a kind of symmetry to quantum mechanics, which hidden variables spoil. It might be worth trying to find a more satisfactory way to capture that intuition formally.
Bell approaches the problem from a completely different angle. KS are interested in questions of abstract logico-mathematical structure. Bell, by contrast, is motivated by a strong philosophical objection to the Copenhagen Interpretation. He particularly objects to the fact that the Copenhagen Interpretation accords primacy to a concept, "observation", which, besides being subjective, is not even sharply defined (see, for example, Bell [1] , p. 174). It is probably fair to say that he does not regard the de Broglie-Bohm theory as a satisfactory solution to the interpretation problem. But he certainly sees it as an improvement on the Copenhagen Interpretation. This means that, where KS are looking for reasons to rule out the hidden variables idea, Bell is looking for clues which may guide us to a fully satisfactory, fully objective interpretation of quantum mechanics.
As Bell sees it the theorem shows (Bell [1] , pp. 8-9 and 164-6) that measurement outcomes must depend, not only on the observable measured and the hidden state of the system, but also on the complete experimental set-up (or measurement context). However, that does not (he thinks) represent any kind of objection to the hidden variables concept. It simply means that hidden variables theories are not classical theories, and so cannot be expected to obey the classical rules. Specifically (ibid., pp. 2, 9, 35, 165, 166) he sees contextuality as the manifestation, in hidden variables terms, of Bohr's [30] point concerning the impossibility of any sharp distinction between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear. Bell's anxiety that the theorem should not be seen as an impossibility proof is so great that it seriously unbalances his exposition. As Mermin [31] notes he seems, in places, almost to suggest that the theorem is "silly". However, the following passage shows that he does not really think it "silly" (Bell [1] p. 166) 7 This word ['measurement'] very strongly suggests the ascertaining of some pre-existing property of some thing, any instrument involved playing a purely passive role. Quantum experiments are just not like that, as we learned especially from Bohr. The results have to be regarded as the joint product of 'system' and 'apparatus', the complete experimental set-up. . . . I am convinced that the word 'measurement' has now been so abused that the field would be significantly advanced by banning its use altogether, in favour for example of the word 'experiment'. 7 Bell does not explicitly mention the Bell-KS theorem in this passage. For some reason he seeks to minimize his own contribution throughout the paper [32] from which it is taken. For instance, two pages earlier (Bell [1] , p. 164) he introduces his contextuality theorem as: ". . . the Gleason-Jauch proof. I was told of it by J.M. Jauch in 1963. Not all of the powerful mathematical theorem of Gleason is required, but only a corollary which is easily proved by itself. (The idea was later rediscovered by Kochen and Specker; see also Belinfante and Fine and Teller)"-as though he himself had nothing to do with it. He gives a long list of names-Gleason, Jauch, Kochen, Specker, Belinfante, Fine, Teller-but omits to mention his own (though it will be found that one of the numbered citations is to Bell [2] ). Quite why Bell should want to pass his theorem off, first as something Jauch told him, and then as something we learned from Bohr, is not entirely clear. Most probably it is connected with his desire to refute KS's allegation, that the result is an impossibility proof.
In other words: the Bell-KS theorem shows quantum mechanics to be so extremely inconsistent with the ordinary idea of a measurement that it would be better not to use the word "measurement" at all. So Bell can hardly be accused of understating the theorem's significance (at least in this passage).
In Sections 1-7 we showed that Bell's most important point-the point that measurements do not ascertain pre-existing properties-remains valid. We now need to examine the rest of what he says in the light of PMKC's discoveries.
When Bell wrote the above passage he had in mind the way that spin measurements work in the de Broglie-Bohm theory (Bell [1] pp. 35 and 163; Dewdney et al [19] ; Holland [20] ; Bohm and Hiley [33] ). In that theory the apparatus interacts with the system, so as to manufacture a value which did not previously exist. The unobservability of the pre-existing values is a consequence of this. So it appears to Bell that there is a deep connection between the unobservability of the pre-existing values and Bohr's point, concerning the importance of the complete experimental set-up.
This part of Bell's analysis clearly does need revision. In the PMKC models the apparatus does passively reveal a value which was already there, as in classical physics. It is true that the experimenter does not acquire any knowledge thereby. So Bell's point, that one cannot ascertain the pre-existing values, still stands. However, this is not because the apparatus actively manufactures completely different values. Instead, it is because the valuation is "pathologically" discontinuous.
One might be tempted to conclude that Bohr and Bell were just wrong about the importance of the complete experimental set-up. However, that would be incorrect. The indivisibility of the system-apparatus complex, on which Bohr so strongly insists, is still a feature of the PMKC models. For instance, we showed in Appleby [14] that, in the case of a system comprising three spin-1/2 particles, the very existence of a property typically depends on the complete experimental set-up 8 (also see the discussion of sequential measurements on a single spin-1 particle in Appleby [18] ).
So the PMKC models do not invalidate either of Bell's two main points concerning the significance of the Bell-KS theorem. They do, however, have a major impact on the logic of Bell's analysis. As Bell sees it his epistemological proposition (concerning our inability to know the pre-existing properties) is a direct consequence of his Bohrian proposition (concerning the importance of the complete experimental set-up). It now appears that he is misled by what turn out to be merely accidental features of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In the general case the two propositions are independent of one another.
Of the two of them, it appears to us that the epistemological proposition is the more important-which is why we said, at the beginning of this section, that the implications of the Bell-KS theorem are primarily epistemological. But let us now qualify that by saying that the Bohrian proposition is by no means unimportant. In particular, it is connected with the non-locality of the MKC models [14] .
Finally, the PMKC models show that the Bell-KS theorem (in its epistemological aspect) only applies to finite precision measurements. MKC misconstrue this implication of their models: for they say that finite precision nullifies the Bell-KS theorem. In fact, finite precision saves the theorem. It is infinite precision measurements that would nullify the theorem, if we could perform them (nullify its epistemological implications, that is-there would still be the Bohrian aspect). This is a very interesting result, which certainly puts quantum mechanics in a different light. It means that it is only the finite precision of real laboratory instruments which prevents us giving a non-hidden variables interpretation of quantum mechanics (what Bell calls an exposed variables interpretation-see below). However, one should not attach too much significance to this point. Even if infinite precision instruments existed our finite precision brains would be incapable of assimilating the information they provided. Moreover, even a quite modest number of significant figures would take us below the Planck length-in which case it would very likely be quantum mechanics itself that got nullified (and the PMKC models along with it).
In Sections 1-7 we defended Bell against MKC. The discussion in this section redresses the balance. PMKC may not have actually nullified Bell's argument. But they have certainly exposed some serious defects.
For the sake of completeness we now present two further criticisms of Bell, which are only indirectly motivated by PMKC's arguments. We noted earlier that Bell is sympathetic to the de Broglie-Bohm theory. This leads him to underplay the significance of his contextuality theorem. Much of the confusion which has afflicted this subject is attributable to that.
Saying that the pre-existing values cannot all be ascertained by measurement amounts to saying that some of those values must be hidden. So it may appear that the main implication of the Bell-KS theorem could be stated as follows: the theorem shows that there is no non-hidden, or exposed variables interpretation of quantum mechanics. Bell, however, is extremely reluctant to admit that proposition: for, as he says (Bell [1] , p.92, footnote 24, his italics), Pragmatically minded people can well ask why bother about hidden entities that have no effect on anything?
It should be noted that Bell is not just worried about what pragmatically minded people might ask. He feels the force of this objection himself. In other words, he fears that his contextuality theorem is, if not exactly a no-go theorem, at any rate something bordering on that. So he tries to find a way of avoiding that conclusion.
In effect, Bell himself tries to nullify his own theorem. His strategy is to amputate the spin observables on which the proof is based
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. He thereby arrives at a kind of "stripped-down" version of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, in which the only beables are the wave-function itself and the particle positions (Bell [1] , pp.10, 34-5, 127-33, 160-3). In this picture "the particle does not 'spin', although the experimental phenomena associated with spin are reproduced" (ibid, p.35).
Bell is under the impression that, in the de Broglie-Bohm theory, measurements of position are always non-contextual. So he thinks that a particle's true position is empirically observable. He considers that a particle has no other intrinsic properties, apart from its position. So it appears to him that every property is empirically observable. He consequently thinks it "absurd" to describe the de Broglie-Bohm theory as a hidden variables theory (Bell [1] , p.201; also see ibid, pp.92, 128, 162-3). He suggests that the term "exposed variables" would be more appropriate (ibid, p.128). It is an opinion that is widely shared in the Bohmian community (see, for example, Bohm and Hiley [33] , p.2 and Holland [20] , pp.106-7).
The first objection to this argument is that it is not in fact true that measurements of de Broglie-Bohm position are always non-contextual. This is shown by the discovery (shortly after Bell's death) of Englert et al 's "surreal" de Broglie-Bohm trajectories [35, 36, 37, 38] . In this phenomenon a particle's trajectory is recorded by an array of detectors. If the detectors are only read after a non-zero time interval, then it can happen that the particle is recorded as having been in one place 9 There are some similarities between this and MKC's approach. Bell and MKC both attempt to circumvent the theorem by only assigning values to a restricted class of observables-a dense subset of S 2 in the case of MKC, positions in the case of Bell. when it was in fact somewhere entirely different. As Dewdney et al [38] note, this is "yet another illustration of the contextuality of measurements".
The second objection is, to our mind, even more telling. In Bell's "strippeddown" version of the de Broglie-Bohm theory objective reality is ascribed to the entire trajectory x(t). So Bell is wrong to think that the instantaneous position x is a particle's only intrinsic property. The time derivative dx/dt must also be considered an intrinsic property. And de Broglie-Bohm velocities are generically hidden. Except in special cases they are completely different from the empirical velocities, found by measurement [20, 28, 33, 39] .
Bell says that it is in the " 'hidden'(!) variables" that "one finds an image of the visible world" (Bell [1] , p.201). This is perfectly true, if by "visible world" is meant the macroscopic bodies of our ordinary experience. In the classical limit the variables are no longer hidden. For instance, if one observes a bus as it journeys intermittently down a London street, then it is the de Broglie-Bohm trajectory that registers in one's brain. However, that is a consequence of the interaction between the bus and its thermal environment (Bohm and Hiley [33] , chapter 8 and Appleby [40] ). Undecohered de Broglie-Bohm velocities tend to be strikingly, and even grotesquely at variance with anything that is actually observed. For instance, the electron in an ns state of a Hydrogen atom is, according to the de Broglie-Bohm theory, always at rest.
For these reasons it appears to us that Bell's attempt to circumvent his contextuality theorem is unsuccessful. Of course, we have only considered the de BroglieBohm theory. One cannot, without more work, completely exclude the possibility that there exists some other theory in which positions and velocities are both empirically ascertainable. But it seems unlikely (see, for example, Clifton's [41] discussion of KS obstructions in the Weyl algebra).
So the Bell-KS theorem does establish that no exposed variables interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible. At any rate, it strongly suggests that that is the case.
The point is non-trivial. The non-existence of an exposed variables interpretation of quantum mechanics is often regarded as obvious. However, the kind of semiintuitive reasoning on which that opinion is based is not a substitute for formal argument, starting from the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics. In any case a little reflection suffices to show that the point is, in fact, very far from obvious. It certainly did not seem obvious to Bell. Also, if the point really were as obvious as is often supposed, then PMKC's discovery, that it critically depends on the impossibility of performing infinite precision measurements, would not have come as such a surprise.
This brings us to our final criticism of Bell. Kochen and Specker see the Bell-KS theorem as an impossibility proof. That, of course, is wrong: Bohm commits no actual fallacy. However, it appears to us that Bell goes much too far in the opposite direction. Bell describes non-locality as a "real problem" (Bell [1] , p.172). By contrast, he sees contextuality as no kind of problem at all. In fact, he appears to regard the idea, that it should be seen as a problem, as "silly" (see Mermin [31] ). We will argue that this dismissive response is just as inappropriate as Kochen and Specker's overly assertive one.
Bell takes this relaxed attitude because he thinks that contextuality only limits our ability to ascertain pre-existing spins. Once one appreciates that it also limits our ability to ascertain pre-existing velocities and (in certain circumstances) preexisting positions, then it becomes clear that contextuality does represent a serious problem.
The problem with a contextual theory just is the fact that the variables are hidden. This means that a contextual theory is, in a certain sense, metaphysical. Bell himself makes the point very clearly when he asks why we should "bother about hidden entities that have no effect on anything" (Bell [1] , p.92). Englert et al [36] make the same point when they say (in connection with the "surreal" de Broglie-Bohm trajectories mentioned above) "if the [de Broglie-Bohm] trajectories . . . have no relation to the phenomena, in particular to the detected path of the particle, then their reality remains metaphysical, just like the reality of the ether of Maxwellian electrodynamics".
Of course, a quantity does not need to be directly observable in order to be physically relevant. In conventional quantum mechanics the state vector of an individual system is not directly observable. Nevertheless, it plays an essential role in the theory: without it quantum mechanics could not function as a predictive physical theory. However, the pre-existing values posited by a hidden variables theory are not like that. There does not seem to be anything that can be calculated using such values that cannot be calculated equally well without them. They seem gratuitous. That is what is meant by calling them metaphysical.
We should acknowledge there are some points to be made on the other side. It is probably fair to say that Bell, in spite of what he explicitly says, is not unaware of the considerations just adduced. However, they are, for him, outweighed by his aversion to the "vagueness" and "subjectivity" of the then orthodox Copenhagen interpretation (Bell [1] , p.160). Bell feels that the de Broglie-Bohm theory, though metaphysical, is at least clear. One need not be a committed Bohmian to acknowledge the force of that argument. Moreover, the fact that the hidden variables idea has, until now, proved to be devoid of predictive power does not necessarily mean that it will always remain so (see, for example, Valentini [42, 43] , Farragi and Matone [44] and 't Hooft [45] ).
Let us also note that the Bell-KS theorem only shows that one cannot, for each observableÂ, identify the pre-existing value ofÂ with the outcome of a finite precision quantum measurement in the approximate direction ofÂ. It does not logically exclude the possibility that one might find out the value by some more sophisticated means.
But, these qualifications aside, contextuality is clearly a problem, in just the same sense that Bell considers non-locality to be a "real problem" (Bell [1] , p.172). Furthermore, it is a problem the PMKC models do nothing to obviate. It is true that the PMKC models are not contextual in the same way as more conventional theories, such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory. But the essential difficulty remains. The postulated beables are still metaphysical.
Indeed, it appears to us that it is the Bell-KS theorem which encapsulates the really fundamental problem. Non-locality simply provides a particularly graphic illustration of this more basic point, that the postulated level of objective reality is systematically concealed from view.
Suppose, per impossibile, that we could perform infinite precision measurements. Then it can be seen from the results proved in Appleby [14] that the MKC models would violate signal locality 10 . In that case non-locality would no longer be a conceptual problem. It would be an empirical prediction. The prediction might be confirmed (implying that relativity is wrong) or disconfirmed (implying that the MKC models are wrong). Either way, we would not be involved in a cosmic conspiracy.
10 c.f. Valentini's [42, 43] speculation, that violations of signal locality might be observable in a large class of other hidden variables theories.
But as it is we believe non-locality to be unobservable. A theory which is profoundly non-local at the level of the underlying beables somehow contrives to be completely local at the level of the observable phenomena. This is certainly objectionable. However, it is only one illustration-albeit a very striking illustration-of the more general point, that the postulated beables are highly metaphysical.
Conclusion
PMKC have made a most important contribution to this subject. However, it is not important for the reason MKC think. The PMKC models do not nullify the Bell-KS theorem. Instead, they give us a deeper and more accurate insight into what the theorem is really telling us.
We have argued that the Bell-KS theorem has a primarily epistemological significance. It concerns the knowledge we acquire by measurement. So what one needs to ask is not: "how much of S 2 can be coloured at all ?" But rather: "how much of S 2 can be coloured in such a way that the colours are empirically knowable?" Once that is understood it can be seen that there is no question of the theorem being nullified.
It can also be seen that the theorem encapsulates the essential distinction between quantum and classical. Quantum mechanics does not (as was once thought) require us to abandon the classical picture, of particles having sharply-defined, fully objective properties. However, it seems that we do have to abandon the assumption, that the properties are empirically knowable. We can, if we like, retain the belief: but only at the price of making it metaphysical. To Bell's "pragmatically minded people" a belief of that kind seems empty.
To some extent these points were already recognized by Bell and by others. However, Bell's account, as we have seen, is vitiated by a number of misconceptions. PMKC's achievement is to devise models in which the essential meaning of the theorem emerges in a particularly pure form. This greatly clarifies the issue.
Finally, let us note that the point, that the distinction between classical and quantum is partly epistemological in character, acccords with the current interest in quantum information 11 . In particular, it accords with Fuchs's idea [46, 47] , that quantum mechanics can partly (and perhaps even mostly) be seen as a "law of thought".
In this paper we have tried to avoid taking sides in the interpretational dispute. But, now that we have reached the end, let us say that we share the pragmatically minded person's distaste for metaphysical theories. On the other hand, we also share Bell's distaste for the vagueness and subjectivity of the Copenhagen interpretation. It appears to us that what Bell says on that score is amply justified. We therefore find ourselves impaled on the horns of a very unpleasant dilemma.
We do not profess to know how the dilemma can be resolved. But one possibility would be to improve the Copenhagen interpretation to the point where it was no longer vague, and no longer subjective. Or, at any rate, not so offensively vague, and not so offensively subjective. Fuchs's "law of thought" idea strikes us as very promising in that respect. However, it would take a great deal of work before that promise could be fulfilled. 11 In this connection let us note that MKC suggest that their models may have implications for quantum computation. However, they are misled by their belief that "once the assumption of infinite precision is relaxed" non-relativistic quantum mechanics can be simulated classically (Clifton and Kent [8] , p.2103). As we have seen (in Section 8) their models actually suggest the exact opposite: namely, that it is only if infinite precision measurements were possible that quantum mechanics might be simulated classically (in which case it would also violate signal locality). As Meyer himself remarks (citing Schönhage [48] and Freedman [49] ) it would not be surprising if a quantum computer performed no better than an infinite precision classical machine.
We deduce that µ(B) ≤ 1 − S 2 J(m) dµ (21) for all B ∈ B. Finally, we note that J(m) is a continuous, non-negative function which is not identically 0. This fact, together with Eq. (2), implies
This proves Lemma 2. Finally, let us briefly consider the size of this integral. An exact calculation, though straightforward, would be somewhat tedious. We therefore confine ourselves to noting that it follows from the definition of J that, for all i, 
For the Conway-Kochen set [22, 23] one has θ 0 = 18.4 o (the angle between the directions (0, 1, 2) and (0, 2, 2)), implying that for this set S 2 J(m)dµ < 0.013 (24) If the Conway-Kochen set maximizes the integral, and if d B is of the same order as the lower bound set by Inequality (22) , it would follow that d B 0.01. However, it would require further investigation to tell whether that is actually the case.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 3
The lemma is a consequence of the Lebesgue-Vitali theorem (see, for example, Shilov and Gurevich [50] , Chapter 10).
Let φ be an integrable function defined on a measure space (X, S, µ) with σ-ring S and countably additive measure µ. Then it can be shown (Shilov and Gurevich [50] , pp. 220-1) that, for almost all x 0 ∈ X, the limit
exists and = 0, provided that for each δ > 0, V δ (x 0 ) is a Vitali set containing x 0 and having µ-measure < δ (for the definition of a Vitali set see Shilov and Gurevich [50] , p. 209). A straightforward modification of Banach's elegant argument to show that the set of cubes is a Vitali system for R n (Shilov and Gurevich [50] , pp. 216-8) establishes that the set of disks S(n, ǫ) is a Vitali system for S 2 . The result is now immediate if we take φ in Eq. (25) to be the indicator function of D (i.e. the function which is 1 on D and 0 on its complement).
